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Abstract 
The paper begins by examining the functions of input-oriented and output-oriented 
legitimating arguments in liberal democracies. At the European level, input-oriented 
arguments remain weak, but legitimacy problems are generally avoided since the policies 
which can in fact be adopted under prevailing institutional conditions are still based on broad 
intergovernmental consensus. For a variety of new policy challenges, however, consensus 
on the choice of European solutions is unlikely to be reached, even though member states 
are unable to cope with such challenges on their own. The resulting problem-solving gaps, 
which may undermine political legitimacy nationally and in the EU, could not be legitimately 
overcome by moving from consensual to majoritarian governing modes at the European 
level. What could help are modes of differentiated integration which allow groups of member 
states to adopt consensual European solutions applying only to members of the group. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Aufsatz beginnt mit einer Diskussion der Funktion input-orientierter und output-
orientierter Legitimationsargumente in liberalen Demokratien. Obwohl die europäische Union 
sich kaum auf input-orientierte Argumente stützen kann, lassen sich Legitimationsdefizite 
weitgehend vermeiden, weil die Politik, die im gegebenen institutionellen Rahmen tatsächlich 
beschlossen werden kann, sich immer noch auf breiten intergouvernementalen Konsens 
stützen muss. Bei einer Reihe neuer Herausforderungen ist jedoch Konsens über die Inhalte 
einer gemeinsamen Lösung unwahrscheinlich, obwohl die Mitgliedstaaten je für sich diese 
nicht bewältigen können. Die Folge ist ein Problemlösungsdefizit, das die Legitimität der 
Politik auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene untergraben kann. Es könnte nicht durch den 
Übergang von konsensualen zu majoritären Entscheidungen überwunden werden, ohne 
gerade dadurch die Legitimationsgrundlage der Union zu gefährden. Möglich und nützlich 
wäre dagegen ein Ausbau der Optionen einer differenzierten Integration, die es Gruppen von 
Mitgliedstaaten erlauben würde, im Konsens europäische Lösungen zu beschließen, deren 
Geltungsbereich sich auf die Mitglieder der Gruppe beschränkt. 
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Introduction 
Given the widespread concern about the “European democratic deficit”, it seems remarkable 
that through most of the history of European integration that was not an issue at all. For 
decades, political actors and publics were content to assume the legitimacy of European 
institutions and policy processes even though these did not resemble the patterns of 
democratic governments at the national level. By contrast, the present debate often assumes 
that a lack of institutional isomorphism with the constitutions of democratic nation states 
must imply a lack of European legitimacy. Ignoring the possibilities, and the importance, of 
functional equivalence, such debates tend to generate either undue pessimism or unrealistic 
hopes and counterproductive recommendations for institutional reform. In order to avoid both 
of these pitfalls, I will begin with an abstract discussion of the prerequisites of legitimate 
governance and then consider the legitimacy and limited problem-solving effectiveness of 
present EU governing modes. Next, I will then try to show that currently discussed 
institutional reforms that would increase problem-solving effectiveness will encounter severe 
legitimacy problems, and I will conclude by suggesting options that might evade this 
dilemma.  
1  Legitimacy 
My starting point is the function of legitimacy beliefs in ensuring effective government in 
liberal polities. In this view, arguments invoking shared legitimacy beliefs imply a socially 
sanctioned obligation to comply with government policies even if these violate the actor’s 
own interests or normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low 
cost. In the absence of such beliefs, government would either be ineffective or would have to 
transform the liberal polity into a police state. If this functional definition is accepted, it also 
follows that the need for legitimation varies with the salience of the preferences that are 
potentially violated. Policies that interfere significantly with life, liberty or property interests, or 
that violate deeply held normative preferences of the governed, will need to be justified by 
stronger legitimating arguments than pareto-superior policies that are thought to increase 
social welfare without violating salient interests. This point will be of some importance in the 
later discussion of the legitimacy of EU policies. 
Historically, as Max Weber has shown, generally accepted legitimating arguments have been 
derived from a variety of premises — religious, traditional, formal-legal, ideological or 
charismatic. Under modern (Western) conditions, however, legitimacy has come to rest 
almost exclusively on trust in institutional arrangements that are thought to ensure that 
governing processes are generally responsive to the manifest preferences of the governed 
(input legitimacy, “government by the people”) and/or that the policies adopted will generally 
represent effective solutions to common problems of the governed (output legitimacy, 2 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
“government for the people”).
1 Taken together, these two types of arguments constitute the 
core notions of democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 1970; 1997; 1999, chapter 1).  
They both start from the normative premise that legitimate government must serve the 
“common good” of the respective constituency, and that this function must be protected 
against both the self-interest of governors and the rent-seeking strategies of special 
interests. In the input-oriented tradition, shaped by the ideals of participatory democracy in 
the Greek polis and of the French Revolution, the starting point is the Rousseauian equation 
of the common good with the “general will” of the people. If that were all that matters, 
legitimacy would be ensured by institutions maximizing either the direct participation of the 
governed in policy choices or the responsiveness of governors to the (collective) preferences 
of the governed. In small constituencies, that would justify direct democracy. Where 
representative government is a practical necessity, Westminster-type institutions maximizing 
the visibility and electoral accountability of majoritarian governments would have the 
strongest claim to legitimacy. However, as Rousseau himself had emphasized, the 
underlying equation of the expressed preferences of a majority
2 with la volonté générale 
depends on highly demanding preconditions.  
To begin with, not every aggregate of persons constitutes a demos — i.e., a political 
collectivity among whose members majority rule could be legitimated (a point to which I will 
return below). Even where that assumption should be unproblematic, however, one could not 
be sure that members of the demos or their representatives will in fact be oriented toward 
the common good. Hence modern proponents of input-oriented legitimating arguments, 
being aware of the totalitarian potential of the Rousseauian tradition (Talmon 1955), have 
returned to nineteenth-century liberalism and its emphasis on “government by discussion” 
(Habermas 1962). Here, the communicative logic of the ideal discourse and the discipline of 
public  deliberation are expected to censor arguments defending “non-generalizable” 
interests (Habermas 1973) and to promote convergence on public-interest-oriented policy 
choices (Elster 1998; Habermas 1996; Dryzek 1990; Schmalz-Bruhns 1995). Unfortunately, 
however, these expectations are hardly incentive-compatible with the very institutions of 
competitive democracy that are generally favored by the input-oriented tradition: Election 
campaigns are not the most favorable setting for “truth-oriented” discourses, and competition 
                                                       
1 In a more extended discussion, one could locate (input- and output-oriented) legitimacy arguments at three levels 
— specific policy processes, characteristics of the government and characteristics of the regime. If a specific policy 
is challenged, an input-oriented justification might show that it had popular support (e.g., in a referendum) or that the 
government that adopted it had electoral support, or that the political system did provide ample opportunities for 
challenging and replacing governments of the day. In the absence of widespread noncompliance, therefore, 
electoral defeats of the government need not indicate serious legitimacy deficits — whereas the rise of parties 
committed to “system opposition” would. For a similar hierarchical conceptualization, see Neil Walker’s (2001) 
distinction between performance legitimacy, regime legitimacy, and polity legitimacy.  
2 For Rousseau, of course, even the volonté de tous would not create legitimacy, whereas most contemporary 
theorists would consider unanimous agreement of the governed as sufficient. The legitimacy problem is thus 
reduced to the justification of majority rule. I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 3 
 
generates “office seeking” preferences that may interfere with the “policy-oriented” 
preferences which the parties would otherwise pursue (Scharpf 1997, chapters 7 and 8; 
Abromeit 2002). In other words, purely input-oriented legitimating arguments in support of 
majoritarian institutions depend on very demanding preconditions and often quite unrealistic 
assumptions.  
In the output-oriented  tradition, going back to Aristotle’s and Montesquieu’s arguments 
favoring “mixed constitutions” and canonized by the Federalist Papers, the common interest
3 
was seen to be as much threatened by the potential “tyranny of the majority” as it was in 
danger of being corrupted by self-interested governors. Legitimacy, therefore, depends on 
governing institutions
4 that protect public policy against both dangers — through the 
assignment of governmental powers to multiple political actors that are separately subject to 
electoral accountability; through the establishment of independent judiciaries, central banks 
and regulatory agencies that are protected against the interference of political majorities; 
through the establishment of veto positions and complex interdependencies between political 
actors; and through a Bill of Rights that inhibits government from interfering with certain basic 
individual and group interests.  
However, at the same time as output-oriented legitimacy arguments emphasize the dangers 
following from the abuse of governing powers, they also presuppose a need for effective 
government with a capacity for achieving common purposes and dealing with common 
problems that are beyond the reach of individuals and families acting on their own, through 
market exchanges, or through uncoerced cooperation in civil society. Within the output-
oriented perspective, there is thus an obvious and problematic tension between institutional 
arrangements designed to prevent wrongdoing by governors and exploitation by special 
interests on the one hand, and institutional arrangements facilitating the vigorous pursuit of 
the common interest and effective problem-solving on the other hand. As the functions of 
governments have vastly increased in comparison to those that were presupposed by 
eighteenth-century normative theories, this tension has also gained in practical importance.  
                                                       
3 The change in terminology implies a shift in the criterion of assessment. Rousseau had taken pains to distinguish 
the public-interest oriented volonté génerale from the sum-total of private interests pursued by the volonté de tous, 
and in the same vein, Habermas (1973; 1996) would allow only “generalizable interests” in public policy discourses. 
The authors of the Federalist Papers, by contrast, and certainly the theorists of American pluralism following in their 
footsteps (Truman 1951; Dahl 1967) take the legitimacy of private interests in life, liberty and property as their point 
of departure. By implication, the “common interest” must then be defined as the social maximum that could be 
attained through ideal Coasean bargains among self-interested parties (Scharpf 1997, chapter 6).  
4 In light of some criticisms, it needs to be emphasized that output legitimacy should not be equated with “output 
satisfaction”. Both input- and output-oriented legitimating arguments only come into play if a policy violates politically 
salient constituency interests. Hence such arguments must refer to characteristics of policy making structures and 
procedures that will generally ensure that policies are common-interest oriented, rather than to the characteristics of 
the substantive policy in question.  4 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
While specific institutional forms vary widely among constitutional democracies, it is 
generally true that more safeguards against the abuse of governmental power imply an 
increase in the number of veto positions, and that more veto players imply a lower capacity 
for effective action (Tsebelis 2002). Depending on differences in their historical experience 
and societal and political cohesion, the constitutions of democratic polities will be closer to 
one or the other pole. Thus, Westminster-type regimes in the UK and, until recently, in New 
Zealand minimize the institutional obstacles against government action which, if employed 
wisely, may facilitate effective policy responses to new challenges, whereas an extreme form 
of multiple-veto constitution has rendered policy reform very difficult in Germany (Scharpf 
and Schmidt 2000).  
In short, democratic constitutions vary not only in the relative emphasis they place on 
structures and procedures supporting input-oriented  and  output-oriented  legitimating 
arguments, but within the context of output-oriented considerations, they also vary in the 
relative emphasis placed on power-constraining versus action-enabling  features. In any 
case, however, all of these normative dimensions are considered relevant for democratic 
legitimacy at the national level; and even if trade-offs are acknowledged, one could not argue 
that performance in one dimension would fully substitute for deficits in another. What all 
variants of democratic polities share, moreover, is a reliance on electoral accountability
5 as a 
crucial input-oriented
6 mechanism for keeping governors oriented toward the common 
interest of their constituencies — which also implies a basic asymmetry between actors that 
are electorally accountable and “independent” governing agencies (Dunn 1999).  
In general, the power to adopt positive policy choices is reserved to the occupants of elective 
offices — presidents, prime ministers, cabinets, and parliamentary majorities. Judicial review 
is generally understood as a restraint on current majorities, rather than as a license to 
legislate (Bickel 1962), and where judicial legislation occurs nevertheless, it can generally be 
overturned by political majorities or super-majorities. By contrast, independent central banks 
                                                       
5 Accountability is a general concept implying the existence of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms in principal-
agent relationships. Constitutional democracies make use of a wide variety of such mechanisms (including 
hierarchical supervision, courts of accounts, judicial review, parliamentary investigations) — all of which serve 
important purposes, but do not add up to “democratic accountability” which is constituted by the electoral 
dependence of governors on the governed.  
6 Since elections are likely to reflect backward-looking responses to past government performance, one might doubt 
their classification as an input-oriented mechanism. Moreover, since voters can only express blanket judgments on 
a diverse variety of policy dimensions, elections are an extremely crude mechanism for expressing voter 
preferences, and governments have many ways of influencing public opinion (Maravall 1999). However, 
governments are not alone in playing such games and, more important, they cannot know, at the time of decision, to 
which outcomes voters will selectively respond at the time of election. Moreover, as Lionel Jospin discovered to his 
disadvantage, voters are not obliged to be fair: If the economy goes well, it may cease to be a salient issue and the 
government may then be defeated on internal security issues, and vice versa. As a consequence, uncertainty 
creates strong incentives for governments to anticipate and respond to a wider range of voter interests than will 
actually achieve political salience at election time (Scharpf 1997, chapter 8). Hence, if anticipation is taken into 
account, it does make sense to consider electoral accountability an input-oriented mechanism. I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 5 
 
and regulatory agencies are explicitly empowered to make policy choices. However, their 
independence generally rests on legislation which also specifies the policy purposes they are 
supposed to achieve and the means they can employ, and their choices could be reversed, 
or their institutional independence revoked, by ordinary legislation if the policies adopted 
should be in sustained conflict with the salient preferences of political majorities. In other 
words, constitutional democracies make use of various combinations of institutional 
arrangements supporting output-oriented and input-oriented legitimating arguments. 
Nevertheless, “political” institutions and actors that must be responsive to input-oriented 
mechanisms of electoral accountability tend to be dominant in all constitutional variants. 
 
2  Legitimacy in the European Union 
As I said in the introduction, the legitimacy of European government is often judged by the 
direct comparison of its institutions with those of national constitutional democracies. But 
given the functional definition of legitimacy introduced above, this criterion may be quite 
inappropriate: If its function is to justify voluntary compliance with policies that violate my 
interests, the need for legitimation will vary with the salience of the interest that are 
potentially at stake. Hence if the legitimacy of European institutions was not considered 
problematic through most of their history, the reason may well have been that European 
policies were not thought to violate politically salient interests.  
2.1.  The need for legitimation 
This basic idea has been central in two strands of the literature claiming that the core 
governing functions of the European Community have no need for democratic legitimation.
7 
Authors writing in the neoliberal tradition of (predominantly German) “economic 
constitutionalism” have insisted that European integration has been, and should be, 
essentially confined to removing national barriers to the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and persons. Interpreting these economic freedoms as a manifestation of basic 
human rights, they conclude that European policies of “negative integration” protecting and 
enforcing these liberties against government interventions are in no need of further 
democratic legitimation (Mestmäcker 1994; Streit and Mussler 1995; Cassese 2002). By a 
different line of argument, Giandomenico Majone (1996) comes to similar conclusions. For 
him, the EU is primarily a “regulatory state”, committed to the definition and enforcement of 
rules promoting (economic) efficiency, whereas it lacks significant taxing and spending 
powers that would allow it to pursue politically salient policies of redistribution. Since, by 
                                                       
7 A somewhat similar, but less dogmatic, argument was recently presented by Moravcsik (2002).  6 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
definition, regulations approximating (Pareto) efficiency will improve general welfare without 
violating significant interests, EU policies are, again, not in need of (input-oriented) 
democratic legitimation. Instead, their (output-oriented) legitimacy needs to be protected 
against political intervention.  
Theoretically and empirically, it is of course fairly easy to punch holes in these affirmative 
arguments. Negative integration will increase the liberties of exporters and importers but will 
interfere with the property rights of hitherto protected producers; the liberalization of 
monopoly services may have benefited consumers (in telecommunications more so than in 
the case of railroads), but it also destroyed hundreds of thousands of jobs (Héritier and 
Schmidt 2000); and any regulation of competitive practices will generate winners and losers 
among the competitors involved. Nevertheless it is true that the market-creating policies of 
negative integration and liberalization as well as European regulations of competition and of 
product standards have had broad support among member governments (Garrett 1992, 
1995; Moravcsik 1998)
8 and were generally met by at least the permissive consensus of 
their publics. In other words, much of what European policy has actually been doing was 
indeed fairly uncontroversial politically, and hence less in need of explicit political legitimation 
(Moravcsik 2002).  
But that state of affairs has been changing for some time. When the Single European Act 
expanded the range of European competencies to include policy areas like environmental 
protection, safety at work and consumer protection, conflicts of interests and preferences 
among member states gained in political salience. In the meantime, the disintegration of the 
Soviet Empire and the “spillover” effects of economic and monetary integration and of 
increasing mobility have pushed problems of internal and external security as well as issues 
of employment and social policy on the European agenda — all of which have extremely 
high political salience in all member states. At the same time, these are issues where 
national interests and political preferences tend to diverge, and where broad consensus 
seems difficult or impossible to reach (Scharpf 2002) — a condition that is bound to be 
further exacerbated by Eastern enlargement.  
As a consequence, the legitimacy of EU policies and of the EU polity has itself become an 
issue of increasing political salience over the last decade and a half. If evidence were 
needed, it is amply provided by both the Commission’s (2001a) White Paper on European 
Governance and its sequel (Commission 2001b), and even more so by the “constitutional” 
debates preceding and following the Treaty of Nice and by the mandate formulated by the 
                                                       
8 Support for the general rule (of free trade, for instance) is of course not falsified by pointing to empirical examples 
of governments fighting specific applications of the rule (Burley and Mattli 1993). If the underlying constellation of 
interests resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma, that is exactly what one should expect — and also the reason why 
governments would agree to delegate enforcement powers to a supranational authority (Garrett 1992; 1995). I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 7 
 
Laeken Summit (2001) and the deliberations of the Convention ─ and most of all, by the 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands. However, before 
discussing the legitimacy problems associated with new policy challenges, and proposed 
institutional reforms that might resolve them, I find it useful to assess the problem-solving 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the governing modes through which the European Union has 
so far been dealing with the policy problems on its agenda.  
2.2.  Modes of Governing 
Governing modes are defined by institutional arrangements specifying the constellations of 
actors participating in policy choices and the decision rules through which outcomes are to 
be determined in case of disagreement among these actors (Scharpf 1997). In the present 
de-facto constitution of the European Union, it seems useful to distinguish between at least 
three such modes, “intergovernmental agreement”, “joint-decision making”, and 
“supranational centralization” (Scharpf 2001a). 
As of now, the foundational governing mode of the European Union is intergovernmental 
agreement. Initially, all governments of member states must decide — through Treaties and 
Treaty amendments that need to be ratified by all national parliaments (and in some 
countries, by referenda) — that certain competencies, otherwise exercised autonomously by 
member states, should be transferred to the European level. In the same process, 
governments must also decide in which institutional mode these European competencies 
should be exercised. They may reserve powers to themselves by insisting on policy making 
through unanimous intergovernmental agreement; they may move matters into the joint-
decision mode involving the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament; or they 
may directly empower the Commission, the European Court of Justice or the European 
Central Bank to make binding policy choices in the mode of supranational centralization 
without the further participation of member governments. These modes differ in their capacity 
to achieve effective policy choices in the face of disagreement among member states, and 
by empowering different actors with differing preferences, they will affect the substantive 
policy outcomes that are likely to be achieved. They also differ with regard to the range of 
choices that could be legitimately taken. 
2.2.1.  The Supranational-Centralized Mode 
The most far-reaching form of delegation to supranational authorities occurs in a two-step 
process. At bottom, there must be an intergovernmental agreement on the Europeanization 
of the policy area. This agreement may also formulate a basic policy choice and then 
delegate its further specification and enforcement to a supranational institution. The clearest 
example is the authority of the European Central Bank over European monetary policy. Its 
mandate to “maintain price stability” (Art. 105 TEC) was defined through Treaty negotiations, 
but in carrying out this mandate the Bank is more insulated against the influence of EMU 8 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
member governments or other politically accountable actors than is or was true of any 
national central bank, including the German Bundesbank.  
The same two-step process applies in all policy areas where the Treaties impose directly 
applicable prohibitions and obligations on member states, or establish rights of individuals 
and firms against their governments. In these cases, the Commission is explicitly 
empowered to initiate treaty infringement proceedings against individual member states and 
the European Court of Justice is empowered to issue formally binding and enforceable 
interpretations of these Treaty obligations. Again, these interpretations could only be 
reversed politically through amendments of the text of the Treaties, adopted  unanimously 
and ratified by all member-state parliaments. As a consequence, there is an opportunity for a 
politically uncontrolled evolution of judicial interpretation which could, and did in fact, go far 
beyond the original intent of treaty-making governments (Scharpf 1999; Alter 2001).
9  
The legitimacy of EU policies adopted in the supranational mode is originally rooted in the 
intergovernmental agreement on the relevant Treaty provisions. Its ultimate location, 
therefore, is at the national level, where it draws on the legitimacy of democratically 
accountable national governments and national parliaments. However, given the fact that the 
outcome of multi-party negotiations cannot be expected to correspond to the individual 
“optimal point” of any negotiating party, it follows that the relevant test cannot be congruence 
with ex-ante constituency preferences (which, if strictly adhered to by negotiators, would 
block agreement);
10 all that reasonable voters could ask for is that the outcome should be 
superior, in terms of constituency interests, to the hypothetical state of affairs that would 
prevail in the absence of an international agreement (Scharpf 2000). As a consequence, the 
legitimacy of international agreements would either depend on outcomes that avoid 
violations of politically salient interests, or it must be covered by the blanket electoral 
accountability of the governments and parliamentary majorities that have agreed to them.  
Strictly speaking, however, this indirect form of legitimation holds only for the original 
agreement, but not for subsequent interpretations of Treaty provisions by the Commission 
and the Court — just as current judicial interpretations of the United States Constitution could 
no longer be legitimated simply by reference to the historical agreement of the “Founding 
                                                       
9 To a lesser extent, supranational powers are also created by European directives and regulations adopted in the 
joint-decision mode. In the enforcement of these more specific rules of “secondary” European law, discretionary 
interpretation by the Commission and the Court is more narrowly circumscribed, but since such interpretations could 
only be politically corrected upon a legislative initiative from the Commission and with the agreement of at least a 
qualified majority of Council votes, some capacity for supranational policy making exists here as well. If the 
Commission had its way, the “revitalized Community Method” described in its White Paper on Governance (2001) 
would greatly expand the scope for supranational legislation (Scharpf 2001b). 
10 Hence governing by intergovernmental agreement must create serious difficulties for all attempts to define 
democratic accountability by reference to expressed constituency preferences, party signals and electoral mandates 
(Manin et al. 1999). I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 9 
 
Fathers” (Bickel 1962). And while it makes theoretical sense to disregard the objections of a 
government when a consented rule is applied against it (cf. footnote 8, above), that would 
not imply that judicial interpretations extending Treaty provisions beyond the historical intent 
of the negotiating governments could be legitimated by the same logic. Moreover, as Karen 
Alter (2001) has emphasized, the requirement of unanimous agreement and ratification for 
Treaty amendments protects judicial legislation against political revision even by very large 
majorities — which also undercuts arguments deriving legitimacy from the assumption that 
all instances of acquiescence by member governments must reflect a tacit consensus 
(Garrett 1992).  
But what type of argument could then justify the policy-making functions of the European 
Court of Justice and the Commission? As is true of judicial interpretation nationally, 
legitimacy beliefs draw on a culturally ingrained respect for “the Law” that antedates modern 
democracy, and on counterfactual beliefs that judges do not legislate but are merely acting 
as la bouche de la loi. What matters more in political terms, however, is the fact that the 
actual manifestation of judicial legislation will primarily take place within the judicial systems 
of member states, where European law is invoked by private parties in controversies with 
their government or with other private parties, and where courts will defer to the preliminary 
rulings of the ECJ (Art. 234, ex 177 TEC). Since national high courts have accepted the 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy as well as the ultimate authority of the ECJ to 
interpret European law, national governments and other parties opposing a particular ECJ 
ruling are typically trapped in the procedures of their national judicial systems whose final 
judgments they could not challenge without challenging the rule of law itself. In other words, 
when European law is applied in national courts, European judicial legislation is immunized 
against political challenges by its parasitic relationship with the legitimacy of the national 
legal order (Burley and Mattli 1993; Dehousse 1998; Alter 2001).  
It needs to be emphasized, however, that the substantive range of policies that can be 
adopted in the supranational-centralized mode is in fact quite limited. The criteria of 
monetary policy to be applied by the European Central Bank are tightly circumscribed by 
Treaty provisions (Arts. 105-111 TEC), and the opportunities of the Court to engage in 
Treaty-based judicial legislation are with few exceptions (one of which is the injunction 
against gender discrimination in employment relations — Art. 141 ex 119 TEC) restricted to 
the fields of negative integration, mobility and market liberalization (Scharpf 1999, chapter 2). 
This is not meant to suggest that these powers are unimportant. European rules on mergers 
and acquisitions are the strictest in the world, and in contrast to the anti-trust law of the 
United States and of other federal nation states, European competition law also applies to 
activities in the public sector of member states and to state aids that could distort market 
competition. These powers interfere with the industrial policies of member states and with 
their service-public functions— which in some countries, such as France, have very high 
political salience  (Lyon-Caen and Champeil-Desplats 2001) — and they also are threatening 
national welfare state regimes (Scharpf 2002). Nevertheless, as of now it is still possible to 10 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
argue that the judicial interpretation of EU Treaty law has primarily served to remove barriers 
to trade and distortions of economic competition — i.e., purposes that had and still have the 
general support of all member-state governments.  
2.2.2.  The  Joint-Decision Mode 
Beyond negative integration and competition law there is, in any case, little that the 
Commission and the Court could do on their own. Instead, the dominant mode in which 
“First-Pillar” competencies are exercised is what I have described as the joint-decision mode, 
and what the Commission (2001b) calls “the Community Method” (Wallace and Wallace 
2000). Here, the Commission has a monopoly of agenda-setting power, and it has the 
freedom to select the individuals, groups and organizations which it will hear and hence the 
inputs to which it will pay attention. However, any legislative initiatives of the Commission 
must be adopted by the Council of Ministers, voting either by qualified majority or by 
unanimity. In preparing its common position, the Council relies on COREPER and the 
Council Secretariat to integrate the positions of national ministries and the work of large 
numbers of preparatory committees staffed by national civil servants and experts. In an 
increasing number of policy areas, moreover, the European Parliament has become a co-
equal partner of the Council whose amendments are also developed in specialized 
committees which allow access to a range of interests that may not find the same attention in 
the Commission and the Council (Pollack 1997). But that is not yet the end of it. If the 
directives so adopted need further specifications before they can be implemented, the task is 
delegated to the Commission which, however, is generally required to consult, or even obtain 
the agreement of, “Comitology” committees in which, again, national civil servants and 
experts must work out broadly acceptable solutions (Joerges and Vos 1999). Finally, 
European directives must be transposed into national law by national governments and 
parliaments, and they must be implemented by national and subnational administrative 
agencies, all of which may have their own preferences and constituency interests in mind 
when exercising discretion. 
In assessing the effectiveness and legitimacy of policies adopted in the joint-decision mode, 
several observations are in point: First, European policy processes in the joint-decision mode 
are highly specialized — choices in agriculture policy are determined by the Directorate 
General for Agriculture, by the Council of Ministers of Agriculture, and by a specialized 
committee of the European Parliament — and the same is true of trade policy, environmental 
policy and all other policy areas in the First Pillar. At all levels, there seems to be less 
substantive involvement of actors representing the concerns of other policy areas or 
government-wide perspectives than is true in national governments and parliaments with 
stronger mechanisms for cross-sectional policy coordination and political integration. As a 
consequence, European policies may sometimes pursue more ambitious sectoral goals — 
for instance in the fields of work safety and environmental policy (Eichener 2000) — than I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 11 
 
one might expect on the basis of a more comprehensive analysis of the national interests 
affected. 
Second, within these sectoral confines, the multi-stage policy process combines the very 
different access opportunities provided by the Commission, by national government 
ministries and by committees of the European Parliament to allow inputs from a wide range 
of interests organized at European and national levels and from experts with diverse national 
and disciplinary backgrounds. Taken together with the potential roles of the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, it seems fair to say, therefore, that 
European policy processes in the joint-decision mode provide opportunities to be heard for a 
range of interests that is at least as wide, and probably wider, than is true in any national 
political system (Mazey and Richardson 1993). 
Third, in structural terms, the joint-decision process must be described as negotiations in an 
extreme form of multiple-veto constellation (Tsebelis 2002). Hence if the style of interaction 
were that of distributive (“bloody-minded“) bargaining, one should expect a low capacity for 
effective action and frequent blockages (Scharpf 1997, chapter 6). From empirical research, 
however, one gains the impression that interactions are generally characterized by a 
considerable commitment of negotiators to search for solutions that are acceptable to all 
parties involved (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Lewis 2000; 
Wallace and Wallace 2000). Nevertheless, the alleged socialization into a cooperative 
interaction orientation and “deliberative supranationalism” can only affect “agents” who 
actually participate in the Brussels rounds, but not their respective “principals” back home. 
Hence it seems plausible that the success of negotiations depends to a large extent on the 
willingness of participants to recognize the political constraints under which all of them must 
work, and to accept that everybody needs to achieve some “victories” that would help to 
ensure acceptance at home — which is facilitated by the fact that political salience tends to 
be highly selective, and that many items on the European agenda will remain below the 
threshold of attention in national politics.  
As a consequence, it seems that negotiators have converged on conflict minimizing 
practices
11 which might be expressed as an informal rule according to which national 
representatives are expected to concede points that are of minor political importance at 
home, but are allowed to hold out on provisions whose inclusion or omission would plausibly 
provoke highly salient opposition in domestic politics (Lewis 1998). Such a rule would explain 
not only the fact that European regulations are often agreed upon even though they require 
considerable (but politically non-salient) changes of legislation and administrative routines of 
member states (Falkner 2000; Falkner et al. 2002; Héritier et al. 2001), but it would also 
                                                       
11 Such conflict-minimizing rules were originally discovered in studies of federal-Länder negotiations in Germany 
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account for the overly complex and detailed character of European regulations — which the 
Commission (2001a) explains as the cumulative result of specific demands from member 
states.  
Taken together, these characteristics ensure that the policies which the EU is in fact able to 
adopt in the joint-decision mode will generally not violate interests that have high political 
salience in the member states. For that reason, the need for legitimation is relatively low. By 
the same token, however, the EU is unable to act when salient interests are in direct conflict, 
and its problem-solving capacity is further constrained by the design weaknesses of 
consensus policies avoiding critical issues and reflecting cumulative and perhaps unrelated 
national demands.  
2.2.3.  The  Intergovernmental Mode 
From the perspective of national governments, however, the joint-decision mode 
nevertheless has its risks. The informal consensus rule in the Council is practiced in the 
shadow of a qualified-majority vote, and the strong roles of the Commission and of the 
European Parliament may force governments to accept compromises that are quite far from 
their ideal points and not much more attractive than the status quo. Moreover, since voters 
are not obliged to be fair, governments of member states cannot avoid political accountability 
for EU policies they have to implement, regardless of whether they voted for or against them 
in the Council. Hence they must see any transfer of competencies to the First Pillar, and any 
move from unanimity to qualified-majority voting within the First Pillar, as a calculated risk. 
They must weigh the benefits of Europeanization (or the risks of having to cope nationally 
with problems requiring Europe-wide solutions) against the risks of having to implement 
European policies that may violate interests and preferences that have very high political 
salience nationally.  
In the fields of economic integration, the latter risks were generally seen to be outweighed by 
the benefits of the Internal Market, and for most member states that also applied to the 
Monetary Union. By contrast, the salience of immigration, internal security,
12 social policy, 
industrial relations, education, or taxation was generally considered to be so high in national 
politics that a general (idealistic) interest in European integration as such was not enough to 
overcome the defense of national autonomy by risk-averse member governments. When that 
is so, governments will only agree on Europeanization on the condition that they must 
remain in control — which, at minimum implies that there will be no qualified-majority votes 
in the Council. If apprehensions are even stronger, governments will also want to avoid being 
put on the spot by the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiatives or having to negotiate 
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over compromises with the European Parliament, and they will seek to disable the 
supranational interpretative and enforcement powers of the Commission and the Court.  
The obvious weakness of the intergovernmental mode is not only that European solutions 
can be held up by a single government demanding special favors — side payments and 
package deals could take care of that — but that European policy is paralyzed by politically 
salient conflicts of interest or preference among its member states. Unfortunately, this is 
most likely to be the case in those policy areas where the capacity of member states to deal 
autonomously with politically salient problems and challenges is most severely constrained 
by the consequences of economic integration and increases in transnational mobility. Among 
these are issues of external and internal security that are presently contained in the second 
and third “pillars” of the Treaty of European Union, but similar conflicts prevent effective 
European action in the fields of employment and social policy, fiscal policy, and taxation as 
well. 
When common European solutions are considered less urgent, the preferred alternative to 
the intergovernmental mode has become the “Open Method of Coordination” which was 
formally introduced by the Lisbon Summit in the field of social policy, but which had already 
been applied avant la lettre by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties to the coordination of 
national fiscal (Arts. 98-105 TEC) and employment policies (Arts. 125 – 130 TEC). In all 
these cases, there is no attempt to adopt common solutions at the European level. Effective 
policy choices and their implementation remain a national responsibility — which also implies 
that their legitimacy rests entirely on national foundations. What the Open Method could 
achieve under these circumstances is to focus the attention of national policy makers and 
publics on problems and goals defined as a “common concern”, to define common indicators 
of success and failure at the level of policy outcomes (Atkinson 2002), and to provide 
opportunities for “policy learning” from the “best-practice” examples of other member states 
(Visser and Hemerijck 2001).  Procedures may be more or less elaborated, but generally 
involve common guidelines, national action plans and reports, peer review based on 
analyses by the Commission, and Council recommendations.  
If national governments are responsive, the process can help them to identify and adopt 
better national solutions (de la Porte and Pochet 2002), and peer pressure may also 
discourage the use of beggar-my-neighbor strategies which, if everybody resorted to them, 
would leave all member states worse off. Yet since member governments remain free to 
disregard recommendations and may also remain insensitive to blaming and shaming 
discourses, problem solving effectiveness of the Open Method of Coordination cannot be 
ensured in the face of divergent national interests (Schäfer 2005). Moreover, and more 
important here, since all solutions remain national, they will also be constrained by the 
constitutional asymmetry which is created by the “supremacy” of all European law (including 
its judicial interpretations) over all national law (Alter 2001). There is no way, therefore, in 
which the Open Method of coordination could relax the legal constraints imposed on market-14 ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ I H S 
constraining and market-correcting national service public functions and social policies by 
the acquis of European competition law and its future extensions (Scharpf 2002). 
2.3.  Problem Solving Deficits and Legitimacy Crises 
My review of European governing modes lead to the conclusion that the range of policies 
which the EU does in fact adopt does not give rise to major legitimacy problems. The policies 
of negative integration that can be imposed in the supranational-centralized mode are either 
supported by broad consensus or covered by the blanket legitimacy of (national) judicial 
systems and a general belief in the rule of law. For policies of positive integration, the 
dominant mode of joint-decision making reduces the need for legitimation by avoiding 
legislation that would significantly violate politically salient interests in member states. In the 
intergovernmental mode, finally, European policies can only be adopted if all national 
governments assume political responsibility for them, whereas the Open Method of 
Coordination avoids legitimacy problems at the European level altogether by leaving all 
effective policy choices to the governments of individual member states. 
However, it also follows from this analysis that the problem-solving capacity of the European 
Union is severely constrained by the institutionalized need to avoid policy choices that would 
give rise to politically salient conflicts. By itself, that state of affairs would not raise significant 
legitimacy issues since, as of now, the EU is not expected to be an effective problem solver. 
By contrast, national governments with comprehensive competencies are held politically 
accountable for outcomes or even states of affairs that the voters strongly dislike, regardless 
of whether these were brought about by political action or by inaction. The EU, however, is 
known to be in charge of limited competencies and, what is more important here, it lacks a 
“government” in the sense of a politically visible center of power that could be held politically 
accountable for unsatisfactory states of affairs. Hence legitimacy issues at the European 
level can only refer to specific policies, rather than to general problems like unemployment or 
the rise of crime rates — and if care is taken to avoid deeply controversial policy choices, all 
should be well.  
Unfortunately, however, that is only half the story. As I have suggested above and argued at 
greater length elsewhere (Scharpf 1999; 2002), the member states of the Union are 
increasingly confronting challenges with which they can no longer cope at the national level. 
In part these are due to international developments beyond their control. This is largely true 
of the new foreign policy, defense and security challenges arising from the end of the Cold-
War stalemate, international terrorism, and the changing priorities of the United States. In 
other fields, however, EU member states are confronting the second-order consequences of 
the very success of European economic integration — which greatly reduced their 
autonomous problem-solving capabilities by exposing them to new economic challenges 
while imposing increasingly tight legal constraints on their choice of potential responses. I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 15 
 
In a nutshell, the success of the Internal-Market program and of Monetary Union has 
dramatically increased not only the intensity of transnational competition in product markets, 
but also the potential mobility of finance and investment capital, of firms’ headquarter 
functions and of production locations. As a consequence, member states are engaged in tax 
competition for mobile bases of revenue and in regulatory competition for mobile 
investments — both of which create pressures to reduce tax rates and to avoid regulations 
that could have a negative effect on production costs and the post-tax rate of return on 
capital. In short, the economic and fiscal opportunity costs of market-correcting redistributive 
and regulatory policies at the national level have increased considerably.  
At the same time, the Common Market has eliminated protective tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions on imports, the Internal Market has eliminated non-tariff barriers, imposed tight 
controls on state subsidies and liberalized trade in services, and the Monetary Union not only 
eliminated devaluation as a policy instrument that could correct for a loss of international 
competitiveness, but it also imposes uniform interest rates that do not fit national economies 
with above-average or below-average rates of growth and inflation, and it constrains the 
fiscal-policy responses of member governments by the deficit rules of the Stability Pact.  
What matters more is the constitutional asymmetry created by these legal constraints. At the 
national level, market-making and market-correcting policies had the same constitutional 
status, so that potential conflicts had to be politically resolved by majority or by 
compromises. Under the legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, however, any rule of 
European law takes precedence over any rule of national law. Since European policy has for 
decades concentrated on economic integration while market-correcting policies have mainly 
remained national, this has created a legal order in which European liberalization and 
competition rules have unconditional priority over national social-protection rules. This 
asymmetry became a major problem after the Internal Market program had authorized the 
Commission and the Court to seriously pursue the goal of service liberalization.  
Unconstrained by the countervailing logic of market-constraining European rules, the 
Commission has vigorously extended the reach of liberalization and competition law into 
fields which, in the mixed economies of member states, had been exempted from market 
competition in the form of public services, subsidized non-profit organizations, or highly 
regulated private monopolies or cartels. In some areas (e.g., telecommunications), the 
outcomes of liberalization, deregulation and privatization have been very favorable for 
consumers, while in others (e.g., banking or railroads) they are mixed or negative. These are 
serious problems in some countries (Lyon-Caen and Champeil-Desplats 2001) . But they will 
pale in comparison to the political crises that will arise if the Commission and the Court 
should be allowed to continue in applying European competition law to the core areas of the 
welfare state, social insurance and social services, which traditionally had been farthest 
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As it is, the application of European law is constrained only by countervailing European law, 
and existing European law could be corrected only under the same rules that governed its 
adoption. In an ideal-type majoritarian democracy, decision rules do not discriminate 
between actors seeking to change an existing policy and others defending its maintenance.
13 
However, as constitutional checks and balances and the number of veto players increase, 
symmetry is lost to the advantage of the defenders of status-quo policies (Tsebelis 2002). In 
the European Union, this asymmetry is in fact more extreme than in any national 
constitutional democracy. Policies adopted in the supranational-centralized mode can be 
changed only by unanimous Treaty amendments and parliamentary ratification in all member 
states, but obstacles to change are nearly as high for policies adopted in the 
intergovernmental or in the joint-decision modes. As a consequence, policies will be 
maintained and need to be enforced even though there would be no chance of having them 
adopted now under the original decision rules, or even by a simple plurality vote.
14  
In other words, nation states have become very much dependent on European solutions in 
order to cope with the “spillover” problems that are caused by successful European 
integration. But under the consensual decision rules which are needed to ensure the 
legitimacy and political acceptance of European policy choices in the intergovernmental and 
joint-policy modes of governing, not only new policy initiatives but also the reform of status-
quo policies is easily blocked by conflicts of interest or preferences among EU member 
states. The expected result is a growing problem solving gap in policy areas where the EU 
generates problems and constrains solutions at national levels while effective solutions at 
the European level are blocked by political conflicts among member governments.  
In the field of external security, such conflicts are likely to arise from fundamentally differing 
collective memories which EU member states associate with the outcomes of both, the 
Second World War and of the Cold War, and from differences in the emotional ties to (or the 
dependence on) the United States. By contrast, conflicts over the European harmonization of 
welfare-state policies, that would protect “Social Europe” against the impacts of economic 
integration and liberalization, arise from basic differences in national economic conditions, 
institutions, policy legacies and normative preferences. They amount to mutually 
incompatible, and politically highly salient differences in the levels of welfare spending, in the 
structures of welfare benefits, and in the types of welfare finance among “Scandinavian”, 
Anglo-Saxon and “Continental” families of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Scharpf 
and Schmidt 2000; Scharpf 2002).  
                                                       
13 I leave aside the mechanisms discussed in the literature on “path dependence” (Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999) 
which may reduce the problem-solving effectiveness of policy choices, but which will not raise significant legitimacy 
issues since they affect the preferences of actors for maintaining status-quo policies. 
14 For that reason, it still makes sense to speak of a European “joint decision trap” (Scharpf 1988): Once it has been 
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3  Remedies? 
If nothing could be done, the resulting problem-solving gap could indeed undermine the 
output legitimacy of national political systems as well as the continuing acceptance of   
European integration. Hence one ought to think about institutional reforms which will either 
increase the legitimate European capacity for effective action in the face of conflicting 
national interests or preferences, or which will restore or protect national problem-solving 
capabilities in fields where they are presently constrained by European integration. In other 
words, integration would either have to take a large step forward, or a step back — and as I 
will try to show, there are reasons to think that it ought to take steps in both directions at the 
same time.  
3.1.  Effectiveness Through Democratic Accountability? 
In its White Paper on European Governance (2001a; 2001b), the Commission suggested 
that the capacity for legitimate and effective European action could be improved without any 
changes in the Treaties simply through a “revitalization of the Community Method” — by 
which it essentially meant a strengthening of its own role in the legislative process (Scharpf 
2001b). In order to increase the Union’s capacity to act, the Council and the European 
Parliament should reduce their own involvement in legislation to the formulation of “essential 
principles”, and they should leave the specification of “details” to the Commission which, 
moreover, should not be required to go through cumbersome Comitology procedures in 
doing so. Normatively, so it is suggested, these procedures would be justified by the fact that 
the European Union has moved from a “diplomatic” to a “democratic” stage, and by the 
implicit assumption that the Commission itself is somehow also a beneficiary of democratic 
legitimacy.  
There has been a good deal of discussion of the White Paper (Joerges et al. 2001) in which, 
it is fair to say, the Commission’s claim that the changes proposed would increase the 
Union’s capacity for effective action has not been seriously challenged. It seems indeed 
plausible that legislative processes would be less cumbersome if Council and Parliament 
would no longer be concerned with “detail”, and one might also expect a greater capacity for 
responding to changed circumstances if detailed regulations could be formulated and 
changed unilaterally by the Commission. For most critics, however, speculation about these 
advantages seemed “academic” since there was no reason to expect that Council and 
Parliament would agree to such a broad delegation of legislative competencies. Moreover, 
the Commission’s bold claim to democratic legitimacy was seen to be both unsupported by 
the present reality of political processes in the European Union and unsustainable in 
normative theory.  
In normative debates, it is generally assumed that the Commission’s present claim is 
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European common interest. In order to attain the democratic legitimacy that could justify an 
expansion of its policy-making functions, it would have to abandon its present status of 
political independence. In principle, so it is thought, the Commission would have to be 
transformed into a politically accountable European government of either the parliamentary 
or the presidential variant. In the first case, the President of the Commission would be 
elected and voted out of office by a majority of the European Parliament; in the second case, 
the President would be directly elected by a majority of voters in the member states. In either 
case, moreover, individual Commissioners would be nominated by, and subject to 
instructions of, the politically accountable President.  
 Of these options, only the first received some attention in the European Convention. In their 
most consistent versions (see, e.g., Gloser and Roth 2002), such proposals envisage the 
European Union as a parliamentary democracy where the government is created by the 
majority (coalition) of disciplined parliamentary parties that prevailed in Europe-wide 
elections on the strength of their candidates for the Presidency and their programmatic 
platforms. It goes almost without saying that in these proposals the EP would gain full 
legislative and budgetary powers, that the status of the Council of Ministers would be 
reduced to that of a second legislative chamber, and that legislative decisions would be 
taken by majority vote in both chambers.
15 If such proposals could be realized, the number of 
veto positions would indeed be reduced and the European capacity for effective action in the 
face of conflicting interests would increase. The problem, however, is legitimacy.  
By constructing blueprints for a majoritarian European constitution, the enthusiasts of 
European democracy tend to ignore the preconditions of legitimate majority rule — some of 
which cannot simply be created through constitutional engineering (Grimm 1995; Howe 
1995). As I said above, in order to be considered democratic in the input-oriented sense, the 
Union should, at minimum, have a chain of ex post political accountability through which 
voters could effectively sanction European policy choices as well as conditions facilitating ex 
ante discussions of highly salient European policy choices and the formation of a Europe-
wide public opinion. As of now, neither of these conditions are fulfilled: As long as European 
elections are still perceived as “second-order national elections”, the European Parliament 
does not link European policies to the electorate in a chain of political accountability; and in 
the absence of Europe-wide media and Europe-wide party competition, policy discourses 
and public opinion remain nationally fragmented (Schmidt 2006).  
While it may have been reasonable to hope that the institutional reforms envisaged by the 
draft Constitutional Treaty would, in time, help to reduce both of these deficiencies, that hope 
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was much more questionable with regard to a third, and more basic, precondition of 
legitimate majority rule — the commitment to a strong collective identity
16 and the belief in a 
“common good” that may override even highly salient collective interests and preferences of 
national constituencies.
17 If that basic belief is not shared, there is no normative reason why 
minorities should accept the legitimacy of policies adopted by a potentially hostile majority — 
think of Northern Ireland, the Kosovo or Cyprus.
18  
It is true that collective identity is also not given once and for all, but may develop over time 
through communication and salient interactions (Deutsch 1953), and that its evolution may 
be furthered through the existence of a common institutional framework. Thus it was not 
wrong to hope that debates about a European constitution and its ultimate adoption might 
themselves contribute to the strengthening of a European collective identity. But the 
referenda in France and Spain have put that hope beyond reach for the foreseeable future. 
In any case, one should not forget that in the absence of dictatorial repression even 
seemingly well established multi-ethnic polities (e.g., the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia) did disintegrate as a consequence of conflicts which could not be 
legitimately settled by majority rule (Heraklides 1990). By contrast, the “consociational” 
constitutions of successful multi-ethnic polities like Switzerland or Belgium have established 
so many veto positions that the salient interests of significant minorities are unlikely to be 
ever overruled (McRay 1974, Lijphart 1999).  
Considering the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, institutional and economic diversity within a 
European Union stretching from Ireland to Bulgaria, from Finland to Portugal, and from 
Estonia to Greece (let alone within a Union that would include Turkey and the precarious 
states of the Western Balkans), it seems clear that any workable European constitution must 
protect the political salient interests and preferences of its national constituencies at least as 
well as these consociational democracies are protecting their ethnic, linguistic or religious 
minorities. In short, if the EU should ever come to resemble one of the national models of 
democratic constitutionalism, its institutions would have to provide for veto positions and 
                                                       
16 In the European context, the no-demos debate has become a mine field. In the hope of avoiding the most 
explosive charges, I hasten to qualify the above sentence by three disclaimers: (1) I do not assume that legitimating 
collective identities need to be based on ethnicity or other primordial characteristics; (2) I do not deny that collective 
identities have been historically constructed and may continue to be reconstructed through political action and 
institution building; and (3) I also accept that collective identities are not necessarily unitary, and may in fact coexist 
at several levels of collective identification. In the latter case, however, it may be necessary to recognize differences 
in the intensity of identification — which will become a critical issue if higher-level collective interests are invoked to 
justify the violation of lower-level shared interests. 
17 If it is true that collective identity may exist at several levels of aggregation (Linz 1997), then it must also follow 
that the relative strength of identification will constrain the severity of sacrifices that may be legitimately imposed by 
governments at each level. 
18 In the light of recent research seeking to demonstrate the existence of a sense of “Europeanness” through public-
opinion surveys, it seems necessary to re-emphasize that my present argument is narrowly focused on the 
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procedural checks and balances that must amount to an extreme variant of 
“consociationalism” (M. Schmidt 2000).  
Since interests and preferences are still primarily articulated and aggregated in national 
political systems, it also follows that the role of national governments in EU decision 
processes cannot be greatly reduced below their present status. That does not rule out 
moves from the intergovernmental mode to the joint-decision mode, and from unanimous to 
qualified-majority decisions in the Council — but it means that the quorum of QMV decisions 
cannot be much reduced, and that the basic ground rules of consensual decision making 
must be maintained. If that is accepted, however, it also follows that EU legislation would still 
not be able to override politically salient national interests and preferences. Hence, neither 
the capacity for effective action in the face of conflicting interests, nor the capacity for 
reforming standing policies that have become obsolete, could be greatly increased by 
constitutional changes that would presently be politically feasible and normatively 
acceptable. 
That is not meant to deny that present procedures and the definition of European 
competencies could be usefully systematized and simplified, and thus made to appear more 
transparent. It also would not preclude moves toward versions of parliamentary or electoral 
accountability of the President of the Commission which would help to increase the political 
salience of European elections (Hix 2002). Yet one also should not expect too much from 
such reforms. In a multiple-veto system, transparency must always remain an elusive goal 
as policies will ultimately emerge from negotiations and compromises for which none of the 
participants could or should be held individually accountable. Moreover, if reforms should in 
fact succeed in politicizing the Presidency of the Commission and in increasing the political 
salience of EP elections, voters might be led to expect that the winners should then be able 
to promote and adopt policies ensuring effective solutions to urgent problems on the 
European agenda. If these initiatives then get bogged down in multiple-veto bargaining, and 
if more intense partisan conflict should in fact exacerbate the difficulties of achieving inter-
institutional policy consensus (Dehousse 1995; Schmidt 2006), then the result might well be 
more political frustration and alienation, rather than greater democratic legitimacy. 
3.2.  Effectiveness and Accountability Through Differentiation? 
So where does that leave us? If input and output legitimacy is to be maintained in 
constellations where problem-solving effectiveness requires European solutions while 
politically salient policy conflicts cannot be settled by majority vote, “something’s gotta give”. 
What ought to give, in my view, is the notion that European policy should necessarily 
generate uniform rules applied equally in all member states.  
This notion has its origin in the early history of European integration when, after the failure of 
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pursued through the second-best strategy of economic and legal integration — with the 
implication that the dual commitment to uniform European law  and to a maximally integrated 
European market became the hallmark of “good Europeans”. As a consequence, decades of 
discussion about forms of differentiated integration — variously promoted under such labels 
as “variable geometry”, “different speeds”, “concentric circles” and the like (Ehlermann 1984; 
Giering 1997; De Búrca and Scott 2000) — have not produced more than the extremely 
restrictive and so far unpracticed provisions on “Enhanced Cooperation” that were 
introduced in Amsterdam and slightly modified in the Nice Treaty (Title VII TEU).  
Once it is realized, however, that the insistence on uniformity prevents effective European 
responses to challenges with which member states are no longer able to cope, and that this 
may undermine political legitimacy at both European and national levels, the unquestioned 
moral commitment to uniformity should give way to more pragmatically useful criteria based 
on  analyses of the underlying problem constellations.
19 If consensus on European action 
could be achieved only among a subset of member states, one would thus need to ask 
essentially two questions:  
•  Would common action by a group of member states have negative external effects 
on other member states that are unable or unwilling to join the group? 
•  Conversely, would the existence of member states that will not join the group have 
negative external effects on the effectiveness of action by the group?  
If neither of these questions could be answered in the affirmative, there is no compelling
20 
pragmatic reason to rule out either European action in the form of “Enhanced Cooperation”, 
or the “opt-out” of member states whose interests or preferences would be violated by a 
policy favored by the majority. In a highly interdependent world, it is true, it will rarely be 
possible to demonstrate the total absence of external effects in one direction or the other. 
What should matter, therefore, is the relative weight of the interests and the salience of the 
political preferences that are at stake on either side. This is, at bottom, a political judgment 
which, on the basis of an examination by the Commission, ought to be made by the Council. 
To discourage hold-outs over side payments, moreover, qualified-majority votes ought to 
suffice when permission is requested for enhanced cooperation or opt-outs. 
In actual practice, such solutions are of course not unknown in the European Union, even 
though they were not adopted under the restrictive procedural rules governing “Enhanced 
Cooperation”. The best example is the European Monetary Union which does not force 
                                                       
19 For similar efforts to develop pragmatically useful criteria, see Philippart and Sie Dhian Ho (2001); WRR (2001, 
chapter 5); Kölliker (2001). 
20 I would not consider the difficulties that the Commission would face in keeping track of differences in the coverage 
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Britain, Sweden or Denmark to join, even though these countries would meet the criteria of 
membership, and even though some negative externalities could be expected if the outsiders 
would try to increase their export competitiveness by devaluating their currencies against the 
Euro. Similarly, even after the Schengen agreement on the abolition of internal border 
controls was incorporated into the European Union Treaty at Amsterdam, not all member 
states of the Union are included. Moreover, under political duress Britain, Denmark or Ireland 
were allowed individual opt-outs from EU policies which they found particularly unpalatable, 
and accession countries were and are often granted derogation from certain requirements of 
the  acquis during a transition period. It should be noted, however, these are usually 
understood as ad-hoc expedients, considered as perhaps inevitable but basically illegitimate 
exceptions from the commitment to European uniform law applied equally throughout the 
Union. Unless they are speedily corrected, so it is feared, the Union will be on the slippery 
slope toward increasing “Balkanization”.   
By contrast, the arguments which I have presented here suggest that one should treat these 
“exceptions” as precedents that illustrate the rationale of generally useful options of 
“differentiated integration”. If it is accepted that uniformity for its own sake cannot be the 
guiding maxim of European policy, these precedents ought to be examined in order to 
search for rules and procedures which would enable the Union (1) to effectively realize 
purposes shared by all of its member constituencies; (2) to assist individual, and groups of, 
member states in coping with problems which can no longer be resolved at national and 
subnational levels; and (3) to prevent individual, or groups of, member states from adopting 
policies that would impose undue burdens on other member states.  
Of these maxims, the first and the third may appear unproblematic, since they correspond in 
principle to the present dualism of “positive” and “negative integration” in European policy 
(Scharpf 1999, chapter 2). Yet both of them will be affected by acceptance of the second 
maxim — which has enabling as well as constraining consequences. It would enable positive 
integration among groups of member states even in the absence of generally shared 
purposes. Conversely, it would also constrain the application of rules of negative integration 
in situations where policies of individual, or groups of, member states have high salience for 
national constituencies whereas potential negative impacts on other member states are 
weak.  
If these maxims were accepted, the present rules governing “Enhanced Cooperation” would 
have to be liberalized. Then a “European Security  and Defense Community” would no 
longer be explicitly excluded under the restrictive conditions maintained in the Treaty of Nice 
(Art. 27b TEU). Instead, the constitutional prohibition would be replaced by the political 
judgment of a qualified majority in the Council. It would have to weigh the merits of pooling 
the military resources and coordinating security strategies among a cohesive group of 
countries (say, France and its Continental partners) as against the disadvantages this might 
impose on others (say, the UK with its trans-Atlantic priorities). While a positive outcome I H S ⎯ Scharpf / Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability ⎯ 23 
 
would by no means be ensured, the creation of European capabilities would at least no 
longer depend on universal participation. 
By the same token, and perhaps less controversially, countries with similar welfare-state 
institutions and policy legacies (say, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) could harmonize their 
social-policy reforms even if the group would include less than the minimum of eight member 
states required for Enhanced Cooperation by Article 43 (g) of the Nice Treaty — and the 
same would be possible for the groups of Continental or Southern-European welfare states 
and, perhaps, for the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Since these 
harmonization directives would have the status of European law, they would have the effect 
of correcting the constitutional asymmetry between market-creating European law and 
market-correcting national institutions and policies.
21 Thus the balance between economic 
liberties and social-protection goals would cease to be an issue decided by the Commission 
and the Court through application of the legal syllogisms of undistorted competition, and 
would again become a matter of political conflict and compromise — within the group of 
countries attempting Enhanced Cooperation as well as between such groups and the 
Council as a whole.  
In the same spirit, the constitutional treaty ought to provide for a generalized possibility of 
“constructive abstention” which would allow individual member states to “opt out” of a 
common policy which otherwise could be blocked by their negative vote.
22 This was the 
solution that allowed the creation of the European Monetary Union or the adoption of the 
Social Protocol (Falkner 1998, chapter 3), and it might also facilitate, say, the European 
harmonization of taxes on capital interest, of the rules for hostile takeovers or European 
action in some areas of immigration and asylum policy. If given the choice, dissenting 
governments might often prefer to allow the majority to go ahead, rather than having to 
choose between obstruction and submission. In view of free-rider temptations (or the “leak in 
the bucket” problem), however, it would still be necessary that opt-outs be allowed by a 
                                                       
21 That presupposes that the substantive rules restricting Enhanced Cooperation — which presently rule out policies 
that might conflict with the acquis, affect the internal market or restrain or distort trade among member states (Arts. 
42, c, e, f  TEU) — are also relaxed. This could be ensured by including “protective clauses” in the Treaty which, in 
analogy to the clauses mandating gender equality (Art. 3 (2) TEC) and environmental protection (Art. 6 TEC) would 
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purposes (Vandenbroucke 2002; Scharpf 2002). 
22 It should be noted that the present Treaty also includes a form of opt-out from existing EU law in Article 88, 2., 
Para. 3 TEC. Under thus rule, state aids that would otherwise be illegal under Articles 87 or 89 TEC are allowed to 
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majority in the Council
23 — which would then have to decide whether, in its view, uniformity 
was more important than the risk of having no European rule at all. 
4  Conclusion 
If both of these changes, liberalized rules for Enhanced Cooperation and the possibility of 
opt-outs, were included in the new constitutional treaty, the Union’s capacity for effective 
action would increase, and so would its capacity for reforming existing legislation that no 
longer fits the interests or preferences of a majority of member governments. Equally 
important, the higher problem-solving capacity would not have to be bought at the expense 
of democratic legitimacy in situations where the politically salient preferences of national 
constituencies might be overridden by majoritarian policy choices at the European level. It is 
also clear, however, that the price to be paid would be a greater variance in geographical 
coverage and hence the increasing patchwork character of European law. 
That price must seem high for those who still hold on to the original goal of a politically 
integrated “United States of Europe”, and who defend the perfection of economic integration 
and the unity of European law as the most significant achievements of decades of struggles 
toward that finalité. But that political goal, which might have been achieved among the 
“Original Six”, has been beyond reach since the first enlargement in 1973 while the 
remarkable achievements of economic and legal integration are generating political 
repercussions that may yet destroy European integration itself.  
When European integration began among the Original Six in the 1950s, their leaders did 
indeed see economic integration not as an end in itself, but as a vehicle that would carry 
them toward the goal of political integration. Given the basic similarities of welfare-state 
institutions and (primarily Christian-Democratic) views of the role of the state in society, that 
view was not obviously unrealistic, even though the institutions which were created then, and 
whose basic characteristics are still shaping the present EU governing modes, made political 
action dependent on very high levels of intergovernmental agreement. It became much less 
unrealistic, however, already with the first enlargement which, with the accession of 
Denmark, the UK and Ireland, added three new member states with extremely 
heterogeneous economic conditions, welfare-state institutions and political orientations, and 
heterogeneity increased further with later enlargements. 
Under these conditions, high consensus requirements and the insistence on uniformity had 
the effect of drastically limiting political  policy choices to issues on which member 
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governments could agree. Since the benefits of joining the larger European market was a 
major motive for, and the acquis of existing market integration a rigid condition of, later 
accessions, agreement on that score was least problematic, and once it was given, the 
supranational powers of the Commission and the Court would ensure its effectiveness. 
Beyond that, however, heterogeneity matters and will prevent effective European action in 
the face of politically salient conflicts among member-state governments or their 
constituencies.  As a result, we have an increasing asymmetry between the increasing legal 
perfection of economic integration, promoted by the supranational powers of the 
Commission and the Court, and the political impotence of the Union in other policy areas — 
but particularly so in the domain of market-correcting social policies. As a consequence, we 
also have an increasing asymmetry between the European extension of economic liberties 
and increasing economic and legal constraints on national social-protection policies.  
I have tried to show that one should not expect this asymmetry to be corrected by the 
creation of majoritarian European governing modes. On theoretical grounds, I have argued, 
these would lack democratic legitimacy on theoretical grounds ─ and the French and Dutch 
referenda on the Constitutional Treaty seem to have put the issue to rest in pragmatic terms. 
As a consequence, European integration, after Eastern enlargement even more so than 
before, seems bound to follow a scenario in which high levels of economic integration will 
entail the progressive disintegration of national social-protection systems, and in which the 
Union will remain unable to assume the governing functions which its member states can no 
longer perform effectively. If this scenario is to be avoided, the Union must find ways to 
complement economic integration with modes of political integration that can accommodate 
a greater degree of national heterogeneity than is presently thought acceptable. I have also 
tried to show that, in principle, controlled forms of “Enhanced Cooperation” and “constructive 
abstention” could increase the capacity for political action in face of diverging national 
interests and preferences. 
Compared to the hopes for democratizing the European polity that have become associated 
with the current debates over the future EU constitution, these proposals must appear 
conservative and defensive. They are indeed derived from the conviction that the “peoples” 
of the European Union are not now, and will not soon become, an integrated nation, and that 
therefore the Union cannot be constructed as an enlarged nation state committed to the 
unitary ethos of a république une et indivisible (Weiler  1995; 2000). At the same time, 
however, these are proposals that would again widen the domain of political choices — as 
distinguished from economic compulsion and bureaucratic-judicial legislation — at national 
and European levels. Since democratic accountability can take effect only where there is 
political choice, the democratic legitimacy of the multi-level European polity would indeed be 
strengthened by the acceptance of differentiated integration. 
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